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the right to organize, the right





as fundamental rights, and these basic
labor rights are materialized in the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act(TULRAA).
Considering that the TULRAA includes excessive restrictions on industrial actions and many provisions
on criminal punishment, however, it is doubtful whether the TULRAA is designed to substantially protect
basic labor rights or it is only to regulate industrial actions. 
Moreover, although taking an industrial action is the legitimate exercise of fundamental rights laid down
in the Constitution, the court of the Republic of Korea requires that laborers abide by strict criteria for the
justifiability of an industrial action in the respect of its entity, purpose, procedure, and methods and
means. If the concerned industrial action fails to fulfill the foregoing criteria, its justifiability comes to be
forfeited and thereupon those who led or joined the action are to assume civil, criminal, and/or
disciplinary responsibility. Since the Republic of Korea carries out a labor policy that is oriented only
toward criminal punishment, it is the reality that a person who plans to be a union leader is prepared to
be subject to imprisonment.
Recently there have been many court rulings on the justifiability of industrial actions, and, at the same
time, there have been heated debates on the validity of those rulings. One of the issues was whether the
industrial actions are justifiable which were taken with the object of resisting massive lay-offs that had
been done in the process of structural adjustment after the financial crisis at the end of 1997. Another
issue was whether it is proper to inflict criminal punishment for failing to observe procedural
requirements on industrial actions. Particularly, even in the cases of the negative type of strikes such as
just rejecting to offering labor, many of union leaders were punished under the Criminal Code despite
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that the concerned action had no additional unlawful factors. This incurred severe criticism and censure
from the international community as well as from the domestic society.
This paper examined recent case laws from the court of the Republic of Korea regarding the justifiability
of industrial actions. This paper also looked into the definitions of a labor dispute and an industrial action

























































Purpose: Political strikes, Solidarity strikes, Management-related strikes, Wage demands for the period 
of industrial action, Disputes of rights, Mandatory bargaining issues, Issues for the Labor-Management
Council to decide, Issues subject to collective agreements valid during industrial actions, Demands that




























Procedure: Precedence of actual negotiations, Adjustment precedent to industrial actions, Simple 
majority affirmative vote by the union members under a direct, secret and unsigned ballot, Prohibition




























Methods and means: Strikes, Occupying workplace, Picketing, Sabotage, Protection of security and 
safety protective facilities, Prohibition of third party support activities 
Finally, the present writer sincerely hopes that the court of the Republic of Korea will make a complete
change in its attitude toward industrial actions, which is conservative and even hostile.
I. Introduction
Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea states:
“Workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining and
collective action to enhance employment conditions,” thereby guaranteeing the
workers’ right of collective action (of which right to industrial action consists the core)
in writing as a basic constitutional right. Such constitutional protection of the right of
collective action is interpreted to have not only the passive effect against preventing
infringement from government agencies, but the progressive effect between private
persons as well.
The principal general statute that materializes the three basic rights of workers
under the Constitution is the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act
(hereinafter the ‘TULRAA’). In the past the relevant statutes were divided into the
Trade Union Act, which stipulates the establishment and management of trade unions,
collective bargaining, collective agreements, and unfair labor practices, and the Labor
Dispute Adjustment Act, which provides for adjustment of labor disputes and
restrictions on labor disputes. However, on March 13, 1997 when the labor law was
comprehensively revised, the two were merged into one statute. Article 1 of the
TULRAA states the purpose of the statute as follows: “The purpose of this Act is to
maintain and improve employment conditions of workers and enhance their economic
and social status by guaranteeing the rights of association, collective bargaining, and
collective action as prescribed by the Constitution, and to contribute to the
maintenance of industrial peace and the development of national economy by
preventing and resolving labor disputes through the fair adjustment of labor relations.”
The industrial actions of workers cause obstacles to business activities of the
employers, and thereby give rise to economic loss; however, obviously they are not
subject to criminal or civil penalization because they are an exercise of a basic
constitutional right. Article 3 of the TULRAA (Restriction on Damage Claims) states
that an “employer cannot claim damages from a trade union or workers when it has
seen loss from collective bargaining or industrial actions.” Article 4 of the TULRAA
(justifiable actions) states that “Article 20 of the Criminal Code (which provides that
acts permitted under statute, actions due to work or actions that are not violative of
social convention shall not be penalized) applies to justifiable actions of trade unions
such as collective bargaining, industrial actions and other actions that were taken to
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achieve the purposes stated in Article 1 of the TULRAA.”
In order for such criminal and civil exemptions to apply in worker’s industrial
actions, the justifiability of the industrial action must first be recognized, and if the
justifiability of the industrial action is not recognized, the criminal and civil
exemptions do not take effect. In particular, in Korea when the justifiability of
industrial actions is not recognized, the senior officials of the trade unions who
organize the labor strikes in the form of concerted refusal to work, are criminally held
liable for having interfered with the employer’s operations. Thus, judgment on the
justifiability of industrial actions bears significance. 
Since the late 1980’s, as the democratic labor movement in Korea matured and
industrial actions became frequent, a large number of judicial decisions regarding the
justifiability of industrial actions emerged and accumulated. Even today, the case law
is going through constant changes. Since late 1997, workers’ demands saw many
changes due to the effects that the financial crisis caused on the working environment,
and new issues on justifiability regarding the objectives of industrial actions began to
arise. Also, the TULRAA contained various restrictions on industrial action
procedures, elevating the importance of the issue of justifiability of industrial actions
with respect to industrial action procedures.
This paper seeks to examine the meaning of industrial action and the elements of its
justifiability by focusing on the regulations in the TULRAA and the most recent court
decisions.
II. Definition of Labor Disputes and Industrial Actions
A. Legislative Method: Statutory Definition
The TULRAA provides for the definitions of labor disputes and industrial actions,
to which the statute applies. Provision of definitions of labor disputes and industrial
actions in statute is not common and Korea and Japan are unique in this respect.
B. Definition of Labor Dispute 
Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the TULRAA defines labor disputes as “controversy or
difference arising from disagreement between the trade union and the employer or
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employers association concerning the determination of employment conditions such as
wages, hours worked, welfare, dismissal and other like treatments,” where the
“disagreements refer to situations in which the parties to labor relations are no longer
likely to reach an agreement by means of voluntary bargaining even if they continue to
make such an attempt.”
According to the above definition, the subjectives of labor disputes are limited to
“issues regarding the determination of employment conditions such as wages, working
hours, welfare, dismissal and other like treatments.” Disputes regarding whether issues
other than employment conditions defined narrowly may be the subject of labor
disputes and that whether performance of employment condition issues already
determined (dispute of rights), which are not issues of determining employment
conditions (dispute of interests) may be the subject of labor dispute, are generally
interpreted to be negative.
The above provision in the TULRAA is criticized as interpreting the range of labor
disputes in an excessively narrow manner and unjustifiably shrinking the right of
collective action. In this perspective, there emerge persuasive arguments for revising
the definition of labor disputes as “controversy or difference that arises from
disagreements between the trade union and the employer or employers association
regarding the maintenance and improvement of labor conditions and the enhancement
of the workers’ economic and social position.”
C. Definition of Industrial Action 
Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the TULRAA defines industrial action as “actions or
counter-actions which obstruct the normal operation of business, such as strikes,
sabotage, lock-outs, through which the parties to labor relations intend to accomplish
their claims.”
According to the above definition, industrial actions seem to include lock-outs by
employers, but the TULRAA embodies the constitutional protection of workers’
collective actions. Hence, it is questionable whether industrial actions by employers
should be permitted. The emerging view is that only trade unions are recognized as the
subject of industrial actions in the TULRAA and that it is enough to permit lock-outs
by the employer as actual counter-actions against industrial actions because lock-outs
by employers are merely counter-actions against industrial actions by workers, and as
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such cannot be regarded as a basic constitutional right.
There is also a question as to whether the claims of parties to labor relations
regarding  the purpose of industrial actions should be understood to mean the “claims
regarding the determination of employment conditions such as wages, hours worked,
welfare, dismissal and other like treatment”. One view is that the ‘claims’ in the
definition of industrial actions should be interpreted independently of ‘claims’ in the
definition of labor dispute.
III. Judging Justifiability of Industrial Actions
A. Significance
Determination of the justifiability of an industrial action is very important because
justifiable industrial actions are exempt from civil and criminal liability and are
protected by the unfair labor practice remedies system.
The old Labor Dispute Adjustment Act did not state a standard for determining the
justifiability of industrial actions, but the current TULRAA stipulates the principle of
industrial actions and their standards. Specifically, it provides that “any industrial
action shall not be inconsistent with the acts and subordinate statutes or other social
order with respect to its purpose, method and procedure.” 1) Furthermore, it provides
that “no member of a trade union shall take part in any industrial action that is not led
by the trade union.” 2)
The Supreme Court decisions consistently perceive the justifiability of industrial
actions from four viewpoints: Entity, purpose, procedure and method. In other words,
in order for industrial actions to be criminally justifiable actions, first of all, the entity
must be the entity which can do collective bargaining, second, the purpose must be to
enable voluntary negotiations between the workers and the employers to enhance
employment conditions. Third, the action must commence after the employer has
refused collective bargaining regarding specific demands for improvement of the
workers’ employment conditions, provided that unless there are special circumstances,
the worker must proceed through procedural requirement in the statutes such as
1) Article 37, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA
2) Article 37, Paragraph 2
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obtaining the affirmative decision of the trade union members and the adjustment
procedures of the Labor Relations Commission. Fourth, the method is subject to
various conditions, such as that it must not conflict with the property rights of the
employer, and must not involve the exercise of violence.
B. Entity to Engage in Industrial Actions
Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the TULRAA prohibits industrial action of a trade union
member that is not led by a trade union, and Article 89, Subparagraph 1 provides for
criminal punishment in case of violation of Article 37, Paragraph 2. 
Supreme Court precedent deemed the trade union, which has the power to engage
in collective bargaining and collective agreements, to be the only legitimate entity to
engage in industrial actions. In other cases, the Supreme Court has decided that the
industrial actions are unjustifiable and not exempt from civil and criminal liability.3)
A trade union in Korea must meet the substantive requirements of independence,
democracy, and organization, and furthermore must meet formal requirements such as
reporting on the establishment of the trade union to the relevant administrative agency
and receiving a certificate.4) When a trade union has met the substantive requirements but
not the formal requirements, it should be deemed to have the authority to engage in
industrial actions, by operation of the constitutionally protected right to collective action. 
Worker’s groups that have been united for the purpose of maintaining and
improving employment conditions or improving socioeconomic positions, should be
recognized as entities to engage in industrial actions if it was formed to exercise
collective force to resolve a labor dispute, since the subject of worker’s rights is the
individual worker.
Article 5 of the Addendum to the TULRAA provides that if a trade union is
established in one business or workforce, one cannot establish until December 31,
2006, a new trade union that has the same organizational jurisdiction as the existing
trade union. Based on this provision, a question arises as to whether the newly formed
trade union can lead an industrial action when it does not meet the formal requirements
3) Supreme Court Decision No. 95Do1016 dated October 12, 1995, Supreme Court Decision No. 91Do324 dated
May 24, 1991, etc.
4) TULRAA Article 10, Article 12
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of reporting its establishment and receiving a certificate. The prevailing view is that
such trade unions cannot be deemed to be the subject of collective bargaining power
under the TULRAA and thus industrial actions initiated by these unions are not easily
justifiable.
In cases where a trade union is organized and a branch office of the trade union or
its certain members engage in an industrial action (unofficial strike) irrespective of or
contrary to the policies of the trade union, some are of the opinion that they should be
deemed exceptionally justifiable in consideration of the demands of the union
members, controlling relations, number of participants in the industrial action, and the
level of organizational independence. Others take the view that such actions can never
be justifiable.  The Supreme Court denies justifiability in such cases.
C. Purpose of Industrial Actions
1. Two Different Basic Views
The purpose of protecting the right of collective action is to maintain and improve
employment conditions and to enhance the socioeconomic position of workers.  Thus,
the breadth of industrial actions whose objectives are recognized as justifiable will
differ depending on how we view the enhancement of employment conditions and the
socioeconomic position of workers.
According to one view, employment conditions and enhancement of socioeconomic
position can be defined narrowly, such that the employer has the authority to manage
and only a few narrowly defined employment conditions may be improved through
collective bargaining. Others take the broad view regarding employment conditions
and enhancement of socioeconomic position, disallowing direct authority to manage
by employers and not uniformly denying justifiability of industrial actions even though
they may be for a purpose that cannot be arranged through collective bargaining.
The typical and customary form of industrial action allows for the authority to
manage by employers and objectives concerning direct economic benefits such as
maintaining and improving employment conditions; however, because of the modern
trend that national legislative acts and policies highly and increasingly influence
employment conditions, directly and indirectly, and the employment conditions of one
company also significantly and increasingly influence those of others. Thus, the
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exercise of collective action cannot be made independent of national legislative actions
or policies or even the employment conditions of other companies. In light of this, it
would be problematic to limit the purpose of industrial actions to the narrow meaning
of working conditions.
However, the Supreme Court has recognized industrial action in only a very narrow
set of circumstances: an industrial action must be for the purpose of further voluntary
negotiations between employer and employees to enhance the employment conditions,
in other words the demands to be achieved by the industrial action must also be a valid
agenda for collective bargaining.5) Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declared that
the purpose of industrial action can be many and that even if one of these is not
justifiable, the justifiability of the action as a whole may be judged by whether the
primary or true purpose is justifiable. If the industrial action would not have occurred
had it not been for the unjustifiable demands, then the industrial action in its entirety
will not be deemed justifiable.6)
2. Political Strikes
Political strikes are industrial actions that are aimed at the national or a regional
government and other governmental agencies, or that are for the purpose of
demonstrating or fulfilling a particular political view of the workers. Political strikes
are unique in that the employer doesn’t have authority to manage as to these demands,
and therefore there is no possible resolution by collective agreement.
There are two different types of political strikes. In a purely political strike the
workers make purely political demands such as in regime-withdrawal-demand-strike.
An economic political strike is related to the broader meaning of employment
conditions, where the workers demand revision of labor laws or changes in labor
policies.
With regard to the justifiability of political strikes, there are three schools: complete
denial, full acceptance, differentiation between purely political strikes and economic
political strikes. The prevailing view in the labor law academia is that at least the
5) Supreme Court Decision No. 94Da4042 dated September 30, 1994
6) Supreme Court Decision No. 91Nu5204 dated January 21, 1992, Supreme Court Decision No. 91Da34523
dated May 12, 1992
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economic political strikes that are closely related to employment conditions such as the
revision of labor laws or the implementation of labor policies are justifiable. Although
recognizing economic political strikes as justifiable requires a sacrifice on the
employer’s part and therefore could be considered unjustifiable, we should regard it as
a reflexive effect of a constitutionally protected right which the employer should
accept and understand.
The Supreme Court, however, strictly limits the purpose of industrial actions to
those to enable voluntary negotiations between workers and employers. Under this
interpretation, economic political strikes in which the employer does not have any
authority to manage may not be deemed justifiable.
3. Solidarity (Sympathy) Strikes
Solidarity strikes are used in order to support industrial actions in another company
or industry. They are similar to political strikes in that the employer has no authority to
manage as to the demands made in such strikes.
Like political strikes, there are two opposing views with respect to solidarity
strikes, either recognizing or denying its justifiability. In Korea, chaebol or group
managements are widespread, and the headquarters of the chaebols or business groups
make the overall decisions on the employment conditions of their subsidiaries and
these decisions are instructed to the relevant companies. In such cases the employment
conditions of one of the subsidiaries can make a huge difference on other subsidiaries.
Also, solidarity strikes should be permitted when a strike at one business site
influences another company due to special circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is not likely to recognize solidarity strikes as
justifiable. 
4. Management-Related Strikes
When a trade union engages in an industrial action in order to attain its
management-related demands, the question arises whether the action is justifiable from
the perspective of its purpose. The majority view in the labor law academia is that
although the managerial power and the right of personnel management lies solely with
the employer, they may become objects of collective bargaining and a justifiable
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objective of an industrial action where it is related to the employment conditions of the
individual. However, determining whether a certain issue is directly or closely related
to employment conditions is not easy.
Since the financial crisis in late 1997, the government and the business sector were
under severe pressure to undergo restructuring. In its process, many workers were laid
off, and the trade unions and workers put up a fierce struggle against the lay-offs.
Eventually, a lot of the officers of the trade unions who engaged in the struggle against
lay-offs were arrested or criminally prosecuted, leading to subsequent Supreme Court
decisions on this issue. The Supreme Court has ruled as follows: “Lay-offs due to
urgent managerial needs are managerial measures by the employer; and if the demands
against lay-offs made by the trade union are that an employer should not lay off
anyone, this would be fundamentally limiting the employer’s managerial powers.
Thus, by principle they cannot be the objects of collective bargaining, and industrial
actions that seek to achieve ends that are not within the range of legitimate collective
bargaining may not be recognized as justifiable purpose.”.7) Essentially this decision
may be interpreted to mean that industrial actions are not justifiable when the demands
are in opposition to the lay-offs themselves, but that they are justifiable if the purpose
was to attain demands regarding a plan to carry out the duty to make an effort to
reduce lay-offs, provision of rational selection criteria for lay-offs and a measure for
employment stability. However, it is not an easy task to specifically determine whether
or not the purpose of an industrial action is to oppose lay-offs itself. Lay-offs refer to
discharge of employees where the employee is not attributable, and they critically
influence the economic and social position of the worker. Therefore, trade unions
should be allowed to make certain demands related to lay-]offs and engage in
industrial actions to attain the ends.
5. Wage Demands for the Period of Industrial Action
Article 44, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA states that “An employer has no obligation
to pay wages to a worker for the period of industrial action during which the worker has
not provided labor because of their participation in the industrial action.” Paragraph 2
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7) Supreme Court Decision No. 99Do4893 dated April 24, 2001; Supreme Court Decision No. 99Do4779 dated
November 27, 2001, etc.
8) Supreme Court Decision No. 90Do357 dated May 15, 1990; Supreme Court Decision No. 90Do602 dated
September 28, 1990, Supreme Court Decision No. 90Do2528 dated March 27, 1991, etc.
provides that “trade unions shall not engage in an industrial action for the purpose of
demanding and obtaining the payment of wages due for a period of industrial action.”
Further, Article 90 states that a violation of Article 44 Paragraph 2 is punishable by up
to 2 years of imprisonment or a fine of up to 20 million won. 
In Korea a trade union is usually formed within a certain company and financially
unstable. Thus, because there are no funds provided for strikes, and the social security
system is too incomplete to be of any assistance, the employees’ means of subsistence
itself would be cut off if they did not receive any wages from the employer during the
period of the strikes. In the past, therefore, the employers have paid the employees
certain sums of money under various other pretexts.
The above provision was inserted in order to put a stop to this practice. However,
although this practice may not be desirable, the question of whether to pay certain
wages during the period of the industrial action should be autonomously decided
between the employer and workers. Holding an industrial action whose purpose is to
attain fulfillment of demands for wages due during the period of an industrial action to
be criminally punishable may eventually be criticized as excessive criminal punishment.  
6. Dispute of Rights
A controversy arises whether workers may engage in industrial actions in order to
win a matter which relates to a dispute of rights. Dispute of rights is not related to the
determination of future employment conditions: they refer to the implementation of the
rights of the workers obtained through prior collective agreements or employment
contracts, or the right of an individual or as a group to seek legal remedies when they
are unfairly treated. With respect to the question of a dispute of rights the Supreme
Court has held that “the arguments between parties to labor relations regarding
employment conditions” include claims related to both individual employment
relations and group employment relations, and the assertion of rights under collective
agreements or employment agreements (industrial action concerning the right) as well
as claims made in order to achieve a new agreement regarding the rights and claims
(industrial action concerning interest).8) The Supreme Court decision rendered on May
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14, 1991 9) held that “If the employer refuses to meet the demands to reach a collective
agreement or is negligent regarding them without a justifiable reason, workers may not
be said to have violated the Trade Union Act just because they engaged in labor
dispute without first having sought remedies under Article 40 of the Act.”
However, the current TULRAA defines labor disputes as “controversy of claims
concerning the determination of employment conditions,” rendering only disputes of
interest related to decisions on employment conditions to be the legitimate objective of
labor disputes but seemingly excluding disputes of rights from the range of objectives.
General practice follows this interpretation. However, even in general civil relations,
voluntary resolution of disputes between the parties is not excluded as a possible
method even if legal remedies exist as the final means of dispute resolution. This
principle should hold even truer in employer- employee relations where autonomy is
regarded as important; settling the issues that may be resolved through a voluntary
negotiation should be a legitimate objective of collective bargaining and labor dispute
even if they concern determination of rights. 
7. Mandatory Bargaining Issues
There is no law in Korea classifying collective bargaining issues as mandatory
bargaining issues, discretionary bargaining issues or illegal bargaining issues. The
Supreme Court, however, in deciding whether an issue is a proper object for labor
dispute mediation, has ruled that issues that create an obligation through collective
agreements (full-time trade union staff, provision of facilities for the trade union, trade
union activities during work hours, treating trade union activities as business trips, etc.)
shall be subject to discretionary bargaining only, and that these disputes are not valid
labor disputes for mediation.10)
However, it would be unfair to arbitrarily classify the possible objects of collective
bargaining, as above and exclude trade union activities from objects of mediation and
arbitration. There is even an opinion by the lower court which differs from a higher
Court’s holding,11) but the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this case.
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9) Decision No. 90Nu4006
10) Supreme Court Decision No. 94Nu9177 dated February 23, 1996, etc.
11) Seoul High Court Decision No. 2000Nu13251 dated May 11, 2001.
8. Issues for the Labor-Management Council to Decide, 
Provided in the Collective Agreement
In a case where a trade union demanded collective bargaining on issues that have
been assigned as an issue to be decided by the labor-management council under
collective agreement, and had engaged in industrial action to achieve these ends, the
Supreme Court ruled that the action was not justifiable.12)
However, even if the issue is one for the labor-management council, that does not
mean that the trade union is deprived of the right to request collective bargaining;
hence, the right to industrial action should be interpreted broadly so that if the labor-
management council fails in reaching an agreement, the trade union may engage in
industrial action. In light of the countless disputes that arise at a worksite with regard to
implementing labor-management agreements, industrial actions should be recognized
as legitimate in order to actually resolve disputes.
9. Issues Subject to Collective Agreements Valid During Industrial Actions
If the demands made in an industrial action are matters regulated under collective
agreements that were valid at the time of the industrial action, it is regarded as an
industrial action that (passively) breaches the peace. The Supreme Court denies the
justifiability of these actions. 13)
However, this issue should not be uniformly decided on its form, but rather should
be decided by specifically analyzing whether there is an objective need to change the
contents of the collective agreement, even though it is still valid.
10. Demands that Require Ratification by the General Meeting of the 
Trade Union prior to Making the Collective Agreements
In order to ensure impartial representation by the representative and to prevent
unfair and arbitrary collective agreements by the representative, often when the
12) Supreme Court Decision No. 94Da4042 dated September 30, 1994.
13) Supreme Court Decision No. 90Nu6620 dated January 15, 1991; Decision No. 92No7733 dated September 1,
1992; Decision No. 91Da4317 dated September 22, 1992; Supreme Court Decision No. 94Da4042 dated September
30, 1994, etc.
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representatives of the parties to the labor relations have reached an agreement on a
collective agreement proposal through collective bargaining, the affirmative majority
ratification by the general meeting of the trade union is required before finalizing the
collective agreement. With respect to this, the Supreme Court has opined that “even if,
as a result of compromise and conciliation between the two parties to the labor
relations, they have reached an agreement on wages or other employment conditions,
there is a risk that a general meeting of the members of the trade union may refuse to
accept the proposed collective agreement thereby rendering the results of collective
bargaining useless. Therefore, an employer is justified in demanding an explanation of
the representative’s complete right to collective bargaining and refusing to engage in
collective bargaining on such a pretext; and industrial action carried out against such
measures are not justifiable industrial actions in terms of the purpose of the action.” 14)
The above Supreme Court decision is based on a previous Supreme Court
decision15) which ruled that the right to collective bargaining by the representative of
the trade union was absolute and that any sort of limitations were invalid. However, we
should not deny the effectiveness of the ratification vote by the general meeting of the
trade union regarding the collective agreement proposal for the following reasons: to
ensure democracy within the trade union; the collective agreement will ultimately
regulate the individual members of the trade union directly; and the uniqueness of
labor relations in that the employer can be seen as a direct party to the employee’s
circumstances rather than simply an opposing party. It is reasonable to compel the
trade union representatives to follow the vote of the general meeting of the members
before or after the signing of the collective agreement: first, because issues related to
collective agreements are a matter for the vote by the general meeting according to the
three objectives of the constitutional provision protecting workers’ rights and the
TULRAA, that is, independence, democracy, and the special character of trade unions;
second, the statute provides for the right and obligation of equal participation of the
members in all issues of the trade union; and a smooth relationship between the parties
to labor relations promotes the development of the national economy. Therefore, the
position that the above Grand Bench decision takes should be overturned.
14) Supreme Court Decision No. 97Do588 dated January 20, 1998; Supreme Court Decision No. 98Do3299 dated
May 12, 2000, etc.
15) Supreme Court Decision No. 91Nu12257-Grand Bench Decision
D. Procedure of Industrial Actions
1. Precedence of Actual Negotiations
Industrial actions are supplementary in nature and should be used as the last resort.
The definition of labor dispute in the TULRAA provides that it is an instance where
the parties are in ‘disagreement’ and “no longer likely to reach an agreement by means
of voluntary negotiation even if they continue such an attempt.” The phrase “no longer
likely to reach an agreement” should be interpreted as meaning that the labor and
management should try their utmost to engage in voluntary negotiations. The parties
should be deemed no longer likely to reach an agreement when bargaining does not
take place despite the efforts of one party, due to the non-cooperation of the other party.
Whether an actual bargaining has occurred should not be measured mechanically by
the number of times negotiations taken place. Should one party block any possibility of
compromise, continuous negotiations would only be a waste of time and effort.
2. Adjustment Precedent to Industrial Actions
Article 45 of the TULRAA states that an industrial action shall not be taken
without exhausting the adjustment procedures (the period of mediation stipulated in
Article 54, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA is 10 days for general businesses and 15 days
for public services), and Article 91, Subparagraph 1 provides for criminal prosecution
of violations (up to 1 year of imprisonment or a fine of up to 10 million won). Article
24, Paragraph 2 of the TULRAA Enforcement Decree further provides that when the
Labor Relations Commission has received an application for adjustment and deems the
substance of the application not appropriate for mediation or arbitration, it shall inform
the parties of the grounds for the inappropriateness and other means of resolution. On
this basis, the Labor Relations Commission has frequently denied initiating adjustment
procedures and returned the adjustment application or issued an administrative
guidance requiring them to continue with further actual negotiations, stating that an
item in the application had not been filled or that the parties were not in disagreement.
Thus, the obligation of adjustment precedent to industrial action has been used to limit
the strike right.  
The old Labor Dispute Adjustment Act provides for the report of labor disputes and
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a cooling off period. The Supreme Court has held that industrial actions that violate
these provisions should not be all regarded as lacking in justifiability, but should
determine the justifiability depending on whether an objective circumstance has made
it impossible to follow procedures. The Supreme Court also held that justifiability of
an industrial action may not be recognized when such procedural violations have
generated unfair results such as unforeseen confusion or loss to the stability of people’s
lives or employers’ business operations.16)
On the other hand, with respect to the system of obligatory adjustment under the
current TULRAA, in a case where the trade union has engaged in industrial action
after the mediation period has passed in spite of the fact that the Labor Relations
Commission has refused to further process the mediation procedures and has issued an
administrative guidance mandating further actual negotiations, the Supreme Court has
ruled that “if the trade union has applied to the Labor Relations Commission for
mediation, the trade union may engage in industrial action after the mediation period
has passed even though mediation procedures have not ended or mediation has not
terminated. It is not necessary for the Labor Relations Commission to make a
mediation determination before an industrial action to make the action justifiable.” 17)
This decision is recognition of the justifiability of an industrial action which takes
place after an administrative guidance recommending voluntary negotiations, thereby
putting a stop to the abuse of administrative guidance by the Labor Relations
Commission.
With respect to the justifiability of industrial actions that have not been preceded at
all by mediation procedures, they are not always unjustifiable just because the industrial
actions have not followed the procedures in the statutory provision, since the purpose of
the mediation precedence provision is to provide an opportunity for mediating a dispute
and through it prevent the occurrence of industrial actions. It is not to prohibit industrial
actions themselves. Instead, we should examine the specific circumstances and
determine whether the violation will bring unexpected confusion or loss to
socioeconomic order or the business operations of the employer, or other unfair results,
and determine criminal culpability according to the determination of justifiability.18)
16) Supreme Court Decision No. 92Nu1094 dated September 22, 1992, etc.
17) Supreme Court Decision No. 2000Do2871 dated June 26, 2001.
18) Supreme Court Decision No. 99Do4812 dated October 13, 2000; Decision No 99Do4779 dated November 27,
2001, etc. 
However, it is not easy to determine whether the action has brought about an unfair
result. For example, in the case of the Munmak Branch of the Mando Machinery Trade
Union, the district court ruled that the action did not generate unfair results and thus
recognized its procedural justifiability,19) but the Supreme Court 20) reasoned that at that
time the company was producing the largest amount of important automobile parts in
the country and that seven branches of the trade union had gone on strike
simultaneously under the directive of the headquarters of the trade union (the
defendants in this case were officers belonging to one of the 7 branches, the Munmak
branch) and that the trade union went on strike six times from January 15, 1998, to
April 28, 1998, without first notifying the company. The Supreme Court stated that in
consideration of the factors such as the size of the company and the nature of the
business, developments of the strike, the length of the strike, the number of times the
strikes occurred and their predictability, the industrial action was judged to have given
rise to unexpected confusion and loss to the socioeconomic stability and the business
operations of the company. Thus, contrary to the decision in the lower court, the
Supreme Court ruled that each of the industrial actions above were not procedurally
justifiable.
A trade union that is not a legal entity may not go through the precedent mediation
procedures, but their industrial actions should not all be dismissed immediately as
unjustifiable. They should be examined in the entirety of the process and considered
and judged with respect to their purpose and methods and whether these give rise to
unexpected confusion or loss.
Meanwhile, new circumstances that arise during the industrial action do not give
rise to separate procedural obligations.21)
3. Simple Majority Affirmative Vote by the 
Union Members under a Direct, Secret or Unsigned Ballot
Industrial action of a trade union, under Article 41, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA,
must be based upon a majority vote of the union members by a direct, secret, and
19) Chunchon District Court Decision No. 98No1147 dated October 7, 1999.
20) Decision No. 99Do4779 dated November 27, 2001.
21) Supreme Court Decision No. 92Do859 dated November 10, 1992.
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unsigned ballot. Article 91, Subparagraph 1 provides that any violation of the above
provision shall be criminally punishable (up to 1 year of imprisonment or a fine of up
to 10 million won).
Such procedural limitation on industrial actions encourages members of the trade
union to engage in such action through democratic decision making, thereby
preventing those actions headed by only a few of the members. Especially, the
limitation is especially interpreted as a policy incentive to strongly encourage the
democratic operation and independent decision-making of trade unions, in light of the
short history of trade unions in Korea. The necessity of this policy, however, is being
questioned. The reason is that when the executive body of the trade union submits the
issue of engaging in an industrial action to a vote, it is usually approved by an
overwhelming majority, and hence it is realistically very difficult to curb the abuse of
industrial action.
The Supreme Court, in the year 2000, rendered two conflicting decisions with
respect to the justifiability of industrial actions and brought about a great controversy.22)
The Supreme Court has since then clarified its position through a unanimous
decision 23); to quote from the relevant portion of the decision, “In engaging in
industrial action, Article 41, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA provides that the union
members must go through the process of direct, secret or unsigned ballot to achieve an
independent and democratic operation of a trade union and to further encourage union
members to be cautious in deciding to start an industrial action, lest some disadvantage
fall on the workers ex post with respect to the justifiability of the industrial action.
Therefore, industrial actions that violate the above procedure shall not be justifiable
unless objective circumstances that make it impossible to follow the procedures are
recognized. If we interpret the provision differently to mean that industrial actions may
not lose their justifiability even when the members did not vote according to Article
41, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA prior to initiating an industrial action and that there is
merely a flaw in the internal decision making process of the trade unions and that the
trade union members have actually been involved in democratic decision making, then
voting by proxy, public vote or ex post vote, assuming de facto affirmative vote, and
22) Supreme Court Decision No. 99Do4838 dated March 10, 2000; Supreme Court Decision No. 99Do4836 dated
May 26, 2000.
23) Decision No. 99Do4837 dated October 25, 2001.
24) Article 91, Subparagraph 1: up to one year of imprisonment or a fine of up to 10 million won.
25) Article 90 of the TULRAA: up to 2 years of imprisonment or a fine of up to 20 million won.
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other similar methods would also be tolerated. Such a view directly contradicts the
spirit of the related provision and the Supreme Court case law. The Supreme Court
Decision No. 99Do4836 dated May 26, 2000 is thereby overturned with respect to the
part of the opinion which states that an industrial action doesn’t lose its justifiability
just because it was not preceded by the above voting procedures as long as democratic
decision-making by the union members have been actually ensured even if the
industrial action took place without the simple majority affirmative vote by a direct,
secret or unsigned ballot in violation of Article 41 Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA.”
The minority view on the majority opinion of the above Grand Bench decision
regards the rationale on justifiability of industrial actions as generally reasonable with
respect to civil actions or administrative proceedings suing for damages or penal
liability; however, the opinion states that with respect to criminal liability of the workers
for interfering with business operations, the court does not have to strictly follow the
above rationale. Some opponents of the above view say that, depending on the specific
issues at the time, a simple strike action by members who merely participated in it may
not be in violation of the law despite the fact that there was no vote.
4. Prohibition or Suspension of Industrial Actions upon 
Decision to Submit to Arbitration and Emergency Adjustment 
Article 63 of the TULRAA provides that a trade union shall not engage in
industrial action for 15 days from the date when the labor disputes have been referred
to for arbitration. In the event of a violation the participants are subject to criminal
prosecution.24) Article 77 of the TULRAA states that when an emergency adjustment
decision has been publicly announced, the parties shall immediately cease the
industrial action and shall not resume industrial action until 30 days have passed from
the date of the public announcement. In the event of a violation, the party will be
subject to criminal prosecution.25)
In the case of essential public interest companies, the Labor Relations Commission
may force arbitration. Depending on how the mandatory arbitration system is operated,
the workers may be effectively deprived of their right to industrial action. This aspect
has brought a strong argument that this is unconstitutional. The Seoul Administrative
Court has agreed to file a petition for a ruling on the constitutionality of such
mandatory prior arbitration and has forwarded the case to the Constitutional Court.26)
Due to the particular nature of the arbitration system and the emergency adjustment
system, industrial actions that arise during the prohibited or suspended period are
practically interpreted and treated to be unjustifiable.
E. Methods and Means 
1. Strikes
A strike is a form of industrial action in which the workers collectively refuse to
work under the supervision of the trade union or other workers’ group. A strike, where
the members of the trade union do not show up for work, is the principal form of
strikes. But, in Korea sit-ins, where the workers take over the workplace, have been
widely practiced in order to prevent the employers from dissolving the strike and
withdrawing from the trade union.
2. Occupying Workplace
Occupying workplace has been widely practiced incidental to strikes because in
Korea the trade unions are organized by firm and that employers are extreme in their
attempts to dissolve strikes, and that each workplace unit takes on an important
meaning as the base for trade union activities.
With respect to the justifiability of occupying workplace, there are various theories,
including complete denial theory, complete acceptance theory, recognition of partial
and coexistent possession theory (which is the denial of complete exclusive possession
theory), recognition of preventing substitute workers theory. The Supreme Court
recognizes the justifiability only when the occupying workplace is partial and
coexistent and doesn’t interfere with operations and prevent the employer’s possession
of the workplace.
However, it is forbidden to possess the following facilities under Article 42,
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26) Seoul Administrative Court Decision No. 2001ku23542 dated November 16, 2001.
Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA and Article 21 of its Enforcement Decree: taking
possession of facilities related to production or other major work; other like facilities
such as electric, electronic computing, communications facilities; carriages on the
railway or tracks; ships under construction, repair or anchored at harbor; aircraft,
navigation safety facilities; or facilities for landing or taking off of aircraft or for
transport of passengers and cargo; materials posing the risk of explosion such as
gunpowder and explosives, or other facilities designated by the Minister of Labor in
consultation with the head of the related central administrative agency to be likely to
suspend or abolish production and other major activities or to cause material damage
and harm to the public interest. 
3. Picketing
Picketing is a supplementary means of industrial action that seeks participation and
cooperation by the public and seeks to deter hiring substitutes or destruction of strikes
by employers. There are various types of picketing. One is literally holding up pickets
and using peaceful persuasion and appealing to a sense of justice. Another form is to
use force to remove possible destroyers of the strike such as non-participants of the
strike, substitute workers, or a company-rescue- team.
There are opposing views on the justifiability of picketing. One is that only
peaceful means of persuasion should be permitted.  Another view holds that use of
force to an extent should be permitted. The other view is that use of force should be
permitted for the purpose of deterring employers from hiring substitute workers.
The Supreme Court Decision No. 91Da43800 dated July 14, 1991, held that
“strikes during industrial actions may be accompanied by the so-called picketing as a
supplementary means or by sit-ins and is in itself not a violation of the law. It is the
principle that picketing should be justified only where the picketers peaceably try to
persuade, either orally or by written means, individuals who choose to continue to
work and not participate in the strikes. Forceful deterrence or physical coercion by
violence, threat, or power may not be justifiable. Occupying worksite may be
justifiable when it is partial and coexistent without completely eliminating the
possession of employers and the operations of the business. If the actions go beyond
this and the picketers occupy the operations facilities of the employer fully and
exclusively for a long-term period, it will be regarded as an infringement on the
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employer’s right to manage the facilities and, therefore, unjustifiable.”
Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the TULRAA states that “an industrial action shall not
be conducted in ways such that they interfere with entry to the premises, work and
other normal operations of individuals who are not related with the industrial action or
choose to work. Also, violence or threat may not be used to appeal or persuade others
to participate in the industrial action.” Thus, the issue has been resolved by legislation.
But, an excessively strict interpretation may render the right to strike useless.
Therefore, justifiability of such actions should be decided carefully in light of the
totality of the circumstances.
4. Sabotage
Sabotage is an industrial action that consists of following the orders of the
employer but refusing to carry out part of the orders and providing incomplete labor,
thus decreasing the level of work efficiency. While strikes are a complete refusal to
work, sabotage is an industrial action that impedes the normal operations of business
by providing incomplete labor. It enables the workers to alleviate the disadvantage
coming from the reduction of wages that follow strikes and yet to still interfere with
the business. Therefore it is often used to put up a show of strong unity before actually
engaging in industrial actions such as strikes or to speed up progress in collective
bargaining.
If one engages in sabotage without notifying the employer, the employer may not
know of the industrial action and therefore will lose the opportunity to seek appropriate
countermeasures, incurring unpredictable loss. Thus, notification may be an important
consideration in judging the justifiability of sabotage.
Meanwhile, unlike the traditional form of sabotage, the type of sabotage where the
members destroy, hide, or arbitrarily dispose of materials, machinery and products, is
generally considered unjustifiable as an industrial action because it gives rise to
excessive intervention into management and loss and damage to production facilities.
5. Protection of Security and Safety Protective Facilities
Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the TULRAA provides that “work to prevent operation
equipment from being lost or damaged, or to prevent impairment or deterioration of
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materials and products shall be conducted in normal manner even during the period of
industrial action.”
Article 42, Paragraph 2 provides that “Industrial action may not be conducted to
suspend, discontinue, or interfere with the normal maintenance and operations of the
safety protection facilities of a workplace.” Administrative agencies can make a stop
order of such industrial action with the approval of the Labor Relations Commission.
The safety protective facilities in the above provision must be interpreted narrowly, as
limited to facilities that protect the safety of life and body. It should not be interpreted
to include facilities that are meant to protect physical facilities. Industrial actions that
contradict the limitation of this provision lose their justifiability. However, unless the
industrial action was planned and carried out in an organized manner with the overall
safety protection facilities as the objective, the justifiability of the industrial action will
be lost with respect to the part whose objective was the safety protection facilities, but
the industrial action in its entirety should not lose its justifiability.
In May 2001, the governor of Chollanam-do issued a stop order of an industrial
action, reasoning that the power part of Yeo-cheon NCC Corporation belongs in the
category of safety protection facilities. Suwon District Court, on October 27, 2001,
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting industrial action with respect to a trade
union, reasoning that the electric, steam, industrial water and machinery provision
facilities of Banwol and Gumi Heat Power Plants in Korea Industrial Complex Corp.
belong in the category of safety protective facilities.27)
6. Prohibition of 3rd Party Support Activities
Article 40 of the TULRAA provides: “(1) a trade union and an employer may be
supported by the persons in the following subparagraphs with respect to collective
bargaining and industrial action: 1. the industrial federation or the national
confederation of which the trade union is a member; 2. an employers’ association of
which the employer is a member, 3. a person the trade union or employer has notified
the administrative authorities in order to obtain the person’s support, or 4. other such
person who is justifiably entitled to provide support under other relevant laws and
regulations. (2) Any person other than those listed in each subparagraph of paragraph 1
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27) Suwon District Court Decision No. 2001Kahap2752 dated October 27, 2001.
shall not interfere in, manipulate, or instigate collective bargaining or industrial
action.” 
Article 13-2 of the old Industrial Dispute Adjustment Act states under the title of
“prohibition of 3rd party intervention,” that “any person other than the parties who
have direct employment relationships, the trade union, employer, or other justifiably
entitled persons may not engage in actions such as manipulating, instigating or
interfering with the industrial action with the purpose of influencing the action.
Provided, actions of the national confederation or the industrial federation the trade
union belongs to shall not be deemed as 3rd party intervention.” There has been much
criticism with respect to the 3rd party intervention prohibition provision above, from
both domestic and foreign sources. Thus, it was inevitable that the provision would be
deleted.
However, the new provision under current law prohibits persons other than persons
from whom the trade union or employer may receive support with respect to collective
bargaining and industrial actions from intervening, manipulating and instigating the
collective bargaining or industrial action. Thus, the actions prohibited by the new
provision are in effect more or less the same as in the old law. Although the new
provision is one step advanced in that it adds to the range of persons excluded from
prohibition: the employer’s groups which the employer belongs to and persons whom
the trade union or the employer notified to the administrative agency. These additions
are still not enough to completely remedy the negative effects of the old law. The best
solution is to completely abolish the provision.
IV. Conclusion
In Korea, if an industrial action is judged to be unjustifiable, the officers of the trade
union will be arrested for interfering with business operations under criminal law and
shall be punished criminally, even if the means and methods are not at all unlawful and
the industrial action is in the form of a simple strike where the members collectively
refuse to provide labor. In addition to the already restricted circumstances, the Supreme
Court has applied an excessively strict interpretation in judging the justifiability of
industrial actions, making it more difficult for trade unions to engage in justifiable
industrial actions. Therefore, a person who is elected an officer of a trade union and
seeks to actively take part in fighting for the rights of the members of the union should
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assume the risk of arrest or even criminal punishment while he or she is in office.
The current trend of neoliberalism deepens unequal distribution of wealth and
decreases the quality of life of the workers. Especially, many Korean firms have been
forced to go through restructuring since Korea received financial assistance from the
International Monetary Fund. In the process, the neoliberalist policy has been
indiscriminately applied in Korea. As a result, many workers were laid off and lost
their means of living, and more than half of the total number of workers became non-
regular workers who were subjected to discrimination and employment instability.
Even in such circumstances workers could not exercise their right to strike, their only
weapon, because of the Supreme Court’s strict opinion on justifiability. Conversely,
they were subjected to criminal punishment.
Jurisprudence on industrial action is not static, but dynamic and ever progressing.
In 2001, a number of Supreme Court opinions have been declared regarding the
justifiability of industrial actions. The high number may seem to reflect the
circumstances that arose after the financial crisis, but problems still exist both
jurisprudentially and realistically. In the future, changes should be made so that the
right of industrial actions of the workers becomes in fact recognizable as the exercise
of the constitutionally protected basic rights, not merely in theory. 
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